Our second author of the day is historian and author Adrian Phillips, discussing the legacy of the Second World War and Chamberlain's fateful decision-making.
The result of December’s general election has rather disappeared from view but it should not be forgotten. It will shape British politics until 2024. Before the Covid crisis, Boris Johnson was giving every sign that he intended to make full use of his hugely reinforced mandate. He has a healthy Commons majority and a – largely – united party behind him, facing a still divided opposition. He can rely on an advisor drawn from outside politics, who practically outranks even the most senior ministers.
It is reminiscent of the domestic political hand that Neville Chamberlain had to play with. Strength in the political machine at home can only go so far though; it does not affect the strength of external challenges. Johnson faces Covid and the EU; Chamberlain faced Hitler. Chamberlain had the political clout to pursue any policy he chose; the one he chose failed utterly.
Reviewers of Fighting Churchill, Appeasing Hitler have taken me to task for arguing that Sir Horace Wilson, Neville Chamberlain’s mighty Civil Service advisor, somehow contributed to the outbreak of World War Two. Certainly, the overwhelming blame lies at the door of Adolf Hitler, but, and it is a big but, Hitler did not operate in a vacuum. His actions were shaped by what he expected others to do and he could read Chamberlain and Wilson like open books. They feared war and they disliked him; Hitler knew that it was the fear that mattered; he did not want to be liked.
The more Hitler dealt with Chamberlain, the more he believed that he feared him. In the Munich crisis of September 1938, Hitler was still unsure whether Britain would go to war if he destroyed Czechoslovakia by force as he truly wanted; this held him. By March 1939 that residue of doubt had almost vanished and Hitler seized the rest of Czechoslovakia.
The catastrophe of the diplomacy pursued by Chamberlain and Wilson was that they failed to convince Hitler that Britain would accept no more. The guarantee to Poland was public and unambiguous, but somehow Chamberlain and Wilson left Hitler thinking that it was meaningless and would not be respected.
The summer of 1939 saw one of the most abject episodes ever in British diplomacy. Chamberlain and Wilson tried to sell Hitler the story that Britain would fight over Poland but still wanted a peaceful, permanent settlement. It was here that Wilson did positive harm.
Hidden from professional diplomats and ministers alike Wilson opened back channels to Germany. The Germans used one to lull Chamberlain into the false belief that Hitler had lost interest in Danzig. Wilson used others to inform the Germans that he would be happy to abandon the guarantee to Poland and sketch out rewards for Germany if it behaved.
When Hitler told his generals that he expected no trouble from the “pathetic worms” of Munich if he invaded Poland, he meant Chamberlain and Wilson.
Did this piece pique your interest? Then why not read Adrian's book, Fighting Churchill, Appeasing Hitler: only £15.00 until 26th April!